Corrections and updates for sixth printing of Osborne and Rubinstein's "A Course in Game Theory" (MIT Press, 1994)

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We thank the following people for pointing out errors and improvements: Lorand Ambrus-Lakatos, Boudewijn P. de Bruin, Salvatore Modica, Giora Slutzki, Lutz Veldman.

Corrections

Page, Line	*Correction*
xv	Martin J. Osborne's email address is now `martin.osborne@utoronto.ca` and his mailing address is Department of Economics, University of Toronto, 150 St. George Street, Toronto, Canada, M5S 3G7.
6, 18	Delete "(first proved by Zermelo (1913))".
32	Replace the first two sentences of the paragraph above (32.2) with: "Note that each function U_i is multilinear. That is, for any mixed strategy profile α, any mixed strategies β_i and γ_i of player i, and any number $\lambda \in [0,1]$, we have $U_i(\alpha_{-i}, \lambda\beta_i + (1-\lambda)\gamma_i) = \lambda U_i(\alpha_{-i}, \beta_i) + (1-\lambda)U_i(\alpha_{-i}, \gamma_i)$."
99, 5	Replace $s^*\|_{h'}$ with $s_i^*\|_{h'}$.
100, 7–8	Delete "(a result first proved by Zermelo (1913))".
100, 9	The official version of chess is not finite, because a player has he *option* of declaring a draw once a position is repeated three times. Our argument applies to the version of chess in which a draw is automatic in this case.
107	Replace the first clause of the sentence starting on line 8 with "Player $P(C(t))$ prefers $S(t+3)$ to $S(t+1)$ to $S(t+2)$ for $t \leq T-3$".
108	On the fifth line of Exercise 108.1 insert "strategic form of the" before "modification".
108, -2	Delete "only".
114, -2	Replace "Kuhn (1953)" with "Kuhn (1950, 1953)".
115, 2	Replace "Kuhn (1953)" with "Kuhn (1950, 1953)".
152, 11	Change "it" to "if".
156, 3	Replace the sentence starting "Consider" and the following sentence with "Consider a strategy $\hat{s}_i$ of player i that differs from s_i only in that after the history $(a^1, \ldots, a^{t-1})$ it chooses a_i, and after any longer history h it chooses an action that, given the profile $s_{-i}(h)$ of actions planned by the other players after the history h, yields at least i's minmax payoff. The outcome of $(s_{-i}, \hat{s}_i)$ is a terminal history $\hat{a}$ that is identical to a through period $t-1$; $u_i(\hat{a}^t) > u_i(a^t)$ and $u_i(\hat{a}^r) \geq u_i(a^r)$ for $r \geq t+1$."

185, 5	After the colon modify the text to read: "for example, if $\gamma = 2$, $\lvert N \rvert = 2$, and $\theta_i = 1$ for both players then the associated game has also, in addition to $(1, 1)$, inefficient equilibria (e.g. $(0, 0)$)".
201	Replace the paragraph starting on line -2 with: "Note that Definition 200.1 extends our definition of an extensive game with perfect information and chance moves (see Section 6.3.1) in the sense that the extensive game with perfect information and chance moves $\langle N, H, P, f_c, (\succsim_i)_{i \in N} \rangle$ may naturally be identified with the extensive game $\langle N, H, P, f_c, (\mathcal{I}_i)_{i \in N}, (\succsim_i)_{i \in N} \rangle$ in which every member of the information partition of every player is a singleton."
217, -2	Replace "Kuhn (1953)" with "Kuhn (1950, 1953)".
218, 3	Replace "Kuhn (1953)" with "Kuhn (1950, 1953)".
226, 1	Replace from the start of the line to the end of the sentence with "equilibrium since the associated assessment violates sequential rationality at player 2's (singleton) information set."
226, 5	Replace $\beta_2^\epsilon(C)(c) = 1 - 2\epsilon$ with $\beta_2^\epsilon(C)(d) = 2\epsilon/(1 - \epsilon)$.
252	At the end of Example 252.1 the perturbed strategy of player 3 should be $\sigma_3^\epsilon(R) = \sigma_3(R)$ if $\sigma_3(R) < 1$, and $\sigma_3^\epsilon(R) = 1 - \epsilon$ if $\sigma_3(R) = 1$.
287, 7	Replace $\geq$ at end of line with $\leq$.
339	Delete reference to Zermelo (1913).

Additional References

The modifications on pages 114, 115, 217, and 218 require the following additional reference.

Kuhn, H. W. (1950), "Extensive Games", *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* **36**, 570–576. [114, 115, 217, 218]